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1. Two kinds of self-knowledge 
Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of self-knowledge. 
The intellect, he says, knows itself in two ways: 
In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or 
Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he 
perceives that he understands. In the second place, 
universally, as when we consider the nature of the human 
mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. (ST I, 87, 1) 
Although the second kind of knowledge about the 
nature or essence of man raises interesting issues, in this 
paper I want to consider just one thesis ascribed to 
Aquinas as concerns the first kind of self-knowledge in 
which the intellect knows its own mental states (hereafter 
self-knowledge simpliciter). This is the thesis that what 
distinguishes human beings from animals is 'a self-
reflexive power that allows them to have not only 
cognitions but also cognition of the truth of their 
cognitions'. (MacDonald 1993, 186) Call this the M-thesis. 
One interpretation of the M-thesis might seem trivial: what 
distinguishes humans from non-rational animals is not 
merely the fact that they are able to have concepts and 
produce thoughts on the basis of the concepts that they 
possess but also that the indispensable precondition of 
being a person is precisely the fact of human self-
knowledge. For what use would our concepts and thinking 
be if we did not know what concepts we are having or what 
thoughts we are entertaining?  
The M-thesis might now be interpreted as 
expressing some kind of Cartesian view according to 
which mind is transparent to the subject and the subject 
has an infallible access to his own mental states. However, 
I will show that it is wrong to ascribe such a view to 
Aquinas.  
 
2. Knowledge of our own mental states 
We can divide our mental states into two groups: 
phenomenal mental states (sensations: bodily feelings and 
perceptual experiences, for example hearing a sound or 
feeling hot), and intentional mental states (cognitive, 
conative and affective attitudes such as my thought that it 
is hot outside or my desire to go back home).  
 
(a) First-person access to phenomenal mental states 
Apparently Aquinas would have no problem with 
ascribing to the intellect knowledge of the first group of 
mental states. For him, as for Aristotle, sensations belong 
to the realm of the sensitive and not of the rational soul. 
The proof of that is the fact that sensory experiences are 
always of particular objects. My seeing a dog is a relation 
between my sense of sight and this particular dog.  
The realm of the intellect, in contrast, is the realm 
of what is universal. The intellect does not understand a 
particular dog but rather its universal canine nature. 
Phenomenal mental states are physiological, and thus the 
intellect by itself cannot have any (self-) knowledge about 
them. Having concepts is not sufficient for thinking about a 
particular experience. That is why the intellect can refer to 
experiences only with the aid of the senses: we need 
perception to be able to point to a particular phenomenal 
mental state that we are having. As Aquinas puts it, 'It is 
clear that our mind cannot be directly aware of the 
individual. We are aware of the individual directly through 
our sense-powers.' (DV, 10, 5)  
One might want to object to the idea that the mind 
knows its phenomenal mental states in such a non-
problematic way, for this seems to necessitate the 
existence of a faculty of inner sense. If mental states are in 
some sense material, then in order to know them the 
intellect has to proceed as it proceeds with phenomena in 
the external material world. For this, on the Aristotelian-
Thomistic (and -Brentanian) theory of knowledge, it needs 
the aid of a sense that would have mental states as its 
proper objects.  
 
(b) Knowledge of our intentional mental states 
Further problems with self-knowledge of our 
intentional mental states turn on the fact that, for Aquinas, 
only thoughts that are somehow based on sense images 
would be about a particular thing and thus the intellect 
could not know them by itself. Presumably, however, there 
are thoughts (e.g. mathematical thoughts) that are in no 
sense connected to sense images. For what sense image 
would we need in order to entertain the thought that 2 + 2 
= 4?  
How, most importantly, could the intellect know its 
own universal thoughts? In the case of knowledge of 
external material objects, the intellect grasps the universal 
form contained in the particulars. The form that existed as 
a particular in an object acquires a new, intelligible and 
universal existence in the mind of the knowing subject. 
What is needed for the cognition of thoughts is that the 
intellect forms second-order thoughts about first-order 
thoughts, where second-order thoughts grasp the form 
from the first level. 
Now, if self-knowledge is really possible and if it 
means having second-level mental state ascriptions, then 
this suggests that there has to be a difference between the 
two levels of thoughts. However, on both levels the 
intellect is referring to one and the same universal form. 
Aquinas himself says that there is a difference between 
thinking about a stone and understanding that one is 
thinking about a stone (ST I, 87, 3). Perhaps this only 
concerns the 'mixed' kind of thoughts, i.e. those in which 
the intellect is collaborating with the senses. If so, then 
would the difference be between the two levels of 'pure' 
thoughts? Could we make any sense of the idea that in 
self-knowledge the universal form from the first-level 
thought acquires some kind of second-level intelligibility 
and universality? And how could the second-level grasp 
the individual that is me in all of this, since it can grasp 
only universal forms? 
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3. Is self-knowledge knowledge? 
(a) Apparent infallibility of self-knowledge 
A person can be said to have knowledge in a 
domain, if she has some true beliefs about this domain 
(without entering into details about what constitutes 
necessary conditions for knowledge). Is this the sense in 
which we have knowledge about our own mental states? 
The Cartesian trend in philosophy would suggest that not 
only do we have knowledge about our mental states, but 
also that this knowledge is total: we know all mental states 
we ever have and our access to our mental states is 
infallible. 
Aquinas says in different places, for instance in 
Summa Theologiae (ST I, 85, 6) after St. Augustine, that 
'the intellect is always true'. This claim as to the infallibility 
of the intellect does not seem to be limited only to self-
knowledge; it should also apply to knowledge in general. 
But is Aquinas denying the very obvious fact that we make 
mistakes in our cognitive activities? One solution to this 
apparent puzzle goes as follows. Consider what happens 
when we think that our knowledge of our mental states 
belongs to what Aquinas calls the first operation of the 
intellect, in which the intellect forms an abstract idea, or a 
concept, of a given object of cognition. On this first solution 
it is then indeed acceptable to say that the intellect is never 
false, but this is so only because on this level of cognition 
we do not deal with knowledge properly speaking at all. 
For according to this solution the workings of our intellect 
are never false because they are never true, either.  
(b) Is Aquinas a reliabilist? 
Aquinas, however, offers a different explanation of 
the reliability of the intellect. Its reliability is not much 
different from that which we usually ascribe to our senses 
– namely that we usually rely on what they report without 
having too many doubts. This is how Aquinas explains this 
fact:  
each potency, as such, receives an intrinsic, non-
incidental ordination to its proper object. But 
whatever has this sort of ordination is always the 
same. Thus, as long as the potency remains intact, 
judgments concerning its proper object are not 
defective. (ST I, 85, 6) 
The veracity of the intellect means that 'it is not 
deceived about its proper objects'. The proper object of the 
intellect is the essence of things. The intellect is correct in 
understanding a thing, if it is 'assimilated to the thing 
understood'. (DA, III, XI) This means that the veracity of 
the intellect consists in the essence of the thing being 
correctly grasped by the concept that the intellect forms. 
(Haldane 1993, 21) I am not quite sure if this is sufficient 
as an explanation. What Aquinas is suggesting is that the 
intellect works like the senses: it is just a fact that, if my 
organ of sight is working properly (and certain other 
conditions are satisfied), then whenever the sense 'sends' 
the information to the intellect that there is a dog before 
me, then there truly is a dog before me. But as we shall 
see, there are still many problems connected with this 
interpretation of Aquinas' explanation of self-knowledge. 
Firstly, this account of the veracity of the intellect 
indicates that its infallibility is something automatic, and 
that Aquinas' theory of knowledge is a reliabilist theory: we 
(usually) have knowledge about our own mental states 
because our mechanism of cognition is reliable. Such a 
reliabilist theory of knowledge, however, would not give 
any support to the M-thesis from the beginning of this 
paper according to which it is the fact that humans can 
consciously appraise the truth or falsity of their own mental 
states that distinguishes them from non-rational animals. 
Aquinas, as it turns out, does not think that reliability of a 
mechanical sort is a good enough guarantee for the 
veracity of the intellect, for he 'makes it a requirement of 
justification that the person possess or have access to the 
grounds constitutive of his justification.' (MacDonald 1993, 
186) 
Another problem one might have with the given 
interpretation is that it seems to leave no room for any kind 
of privileged access that a subject has to her mental 
states. Instead, it suggests that we are as reliable or as 
likely to make mistakes in our statements about our mental 
states as we are in our statements about external objects. 
Again, this claim is not necessarily implausible. However, 
in order to provide a plausible support for the M-thesis we 
need to defend some kind of special access in the case of 
self-knowledge. 
 
4. The special character of self-knowledge 
Robert Pasnau in his Thomas Aquinas on Human 
Nature claims explicitly that Aquinas 'accounts for the 
special access we so clearly do have to our minds' through 
his theory of the reflective method of self-knowledge. 
(Pasnau 2002) 
(a) Inner-sense model of self-knowledge 
In the passage already quoted above Aquinas 
says: 'Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul 
because he perceives that he understands.' (ST I, 87, 1) 
This suggests that the intellect directly grasps its own 
actions and that it somehow automatically perceives its 
own actions whenever they happen. Here, again, we might 
surmise that Aquinas is endorsing a Lockean 'inner sense' 
view about self-knowledge, a view according to which it is 
by acts of introspection (or by means of a special inner 
sense) that we perceive our mental states. On this view, as 
we said before, the intellect would have to form some 
higher-level ideas or concepts about its own mental states. 
However, as Pasnau puts it,  
Aquinas denies that self-knowledge involves any 
further, special idea of ourselves or our own actions. (…) 
there is no further set of ideas, derived directly from mind, 
and what ideas we have of mind, we have precisely from 
things without. (Pasnau 2002, 342) 
In Question 87 of the first part of the Summa 
Aquinas explains that the intellect is by its nature directed 
toward objects outside the mind. Self-knowledge, then, can 
only be a secondary activity of the intellect. Human 
intellect has no direct access to its own mental states and 
it can acquire knowledge of them only indirectly, by 
'apprehending external things.' (Pasnau 2002, 341) This is 
so because 'there is no such thing as pure thinking: 
whenever we think, we are thinking of something.' (Kenny 
1993, 121) Consequently, the natural role of concepts or 
ideas is to be the means and not the objects of thought. 
Concepts and ideas can become object of thoughts in 
reflection (Haldane 1993, 21) but not in the way in which 
the introspective model of self-knowledge suggests. 
(b) Reflexive model of self-knowledge 
Aquinas calls the way in which the intellect grasps 
its own actions 'a kind of return' or 'a kind of reflection' (DV, 
10, 9) and he compares it to the way in which we look in a 
mirror: 
Through a likeness within vision obtained from a 
mirror, one's vision is directly drawn to cognize the 
reflected object; but by turning back in a way it is drawn 
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through that same [internal likeness] to the likeness that is 
in the mirror. (DV, 2, 6) 
When I look at myself in a mirror, what I usually 
see is, precisely, myself. Of course, I can also see the 
mirror, but only by making a special effort in this direction. 
In the same way, external things are the primary objects of 
thought, and thought itself can be known by the intellect 
only by some special effort on the part of the intellect. 
Therefore, as Pasnau notes, 'reflection, for Aquinas, is not 
an introspective turning away from external things, but a 
certain way of looking at external things: it is an outward 
look that is reflected back within.' (Pasnau 2002, 343)  
Brentano (1969) seems to be advancing a view 
similar to Aquinas'. He claims that all our mental 
phenomena are intentional. This means that they are first 
of all directed to their objects; at the same time, each of 
them is also accompanied by a secondary consciousness 
of the mental act itself. Aquinas would thus agree with 
Brentano that it is not by turning away from the external 
world and looking within that we discover our own 
thoughts, but rather 'by attending in a special way' to the 
content of our original thoughts about the external world.  
(c) Are all our mental states conscious? 
According to Pasnau (Pasnau 2002, 344-347), 
there is one more similarity between Aquinas' and 
Brentano's views: both of them take consciousness for 
granted. This, Pasnau claims, is what constitutes a weak 
point in Aquinas' theory of self-knowledge. It is true that for 
Brentano every mental act is conscious as a matter of 
definition. I think, however, that Pasnau is going too far 
when he suggests that also for Aquinas self-knowledge is 
possible only because all of our mental states are 
conscious. To prove my point it will be useful to make 
another distinction within the initial typology of mental 
states presented above. For Aquinas, what I called 
intentional mental states do not constitute a homogeneous 
group. Rather, he would consider some of our beliefs and 
desires as dispositions to a certain kind of behavior. (ST, I, 
87, 2) Those mental states that are always conscious, on 
the other hand, belong to another group: the group of 
propositional mental states; I will call them, simply, 
thoughts. (In fact, the same beliefs and desires could 
belong to either of the two groups; when they are not 
conscious, we call them dispositions.) 
On this view, the intellect learns about its own 
dispositions in the same way in which it learns about other 
people's beliefs and desires, that is to say by observing its 
own behavior. As for thoughts, it seems that they always 
must be expressed (or be expressible) in language. My 
beliefs and desires can properly be called conscious only 
when I formulate them in language (either overtly to other 
people or silently to myself). If this is so, then it turns out 
that for Aquinas the special character of the human 
capacity for self-knowledge is in the end due to the fact 
that only human beings possess language.  
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